A direct deposit change request scam, also called payroll diversion, is when a criminal pretends to be one of your employees and asks you to send their paycheck to a new bank account. This guide is for small business owners, office managers and anyone who runs payroll in Monterey County and surrounding areas. It explains how the scam works, the signs that give it away, and a simple process that stops it without slowing down real changes.
The blind spot: most businesses spend their fraud attention on large wire transfers and vendor invoices. Payroll feels safe because the money goes to people you know. That is exactly why attackers target it.
1. How the direct deposit scam works
The email is short and polite. "Hi, I changed banks. Can you update my direct deposit before Friday? What do you need from me?" It appears to come from an employee you know, often someone in the field or on the road who is hard to reach in person.
- The sender is fake or hijacked. Sometimes it is a free email account using the employee's name. Sometimes it is the employee's real work mailbox after a business email compromise, which makes it much harder to spot.
- The new account is a prepaid card or a fresh online bank account. Money that lands there is usually moved out within hours.
- Nobody notices until payday. The real employee asks where their check is. By then one or two pay periods may be gone, and the business often has to pay the employee again.
The same trick also arrives by text message, and more and more through a fake call to HR. Our guide to SMS phishing covers the text version.
2. Red flags in a payroll change request
Any one of these is a reason to stop and verify. Two or more together almost always mean fraud.
- Urgency tied to a pay date. "Before this Friday's payroll" is the most common line.
- Email or text only. The person avoids a call, says they are busy, or says their phone is broken.
- A sender address that is close but not right. A personal email, a misspelled name, or a lookalike domain. Your external sender warning banner should flag it.
- Questions about the process. "What form do you need?" is how the attacker learns your procedure.
- Replies that go somewhere else. Check the reply-to address. A hidden forwarding rule in a real mailbox can also send your answers to the attacker.
3. A verification process that takes two minutes
Fraud prevention for payroll is mostly a written rule that everyone follows, including the owner.
- Make it policy that bank details never change from an email or text. Put it in writing and tell staff on day one so a real request never feels insulting.
- Verify by voice or in person. Call the employee on the phone number already in your HR file. If you cannot reach them, the change waits until the next pay cycle.
- Prefer employee self-service. Most payroll systems let staff update their own banking through a portal. Turn on multi-factor authentication for that portal so a stolen password is not enough.
- Send a change confirmation. After any update, notify the employee at their known email and phone. A real employee who did not ask for it will speak up fast.
- Protect the payroll admin account. The person who runs payroll needs strong MFA, a unique password from a password manager, and no shared logins.
If a fake request already went through, call your bank and your payroll provider right away to try to stop or recall the deposit, file a report at ic3.gov, and have someone check the employee's mailbox for signs of takeover. Our incident response plan guide shows who should do what.
The takeaway
Payroll diversion works because the request looks boring and the money goes quietly. A single rule, no bank changes without a call to a number you already have, shuts it down. Add MFA on email and payroll, a confirmation notice after every change, and a quick reminder to staff before the busy end-of-year pay periods. For help locking down email and payroll access, see our cybersecurity and managed IT services, or check current pricing.
Frequently asked questions
What is a payroll diversion scam?
Payroll diversion is a scam where a criminal pretends to be an employee and asks HR or payroll to change their direct deposit to a new bank account. The next paycheck goes to the criminal instead of the employee.
How do I verify a direct deposit change request from an employee?
Call the employee on the phone number already in your HR records, or confirm in person. Never use contact details from the request itself. If you cannot reach them, hold the change until the next pay cycle.
Is it safe to change direct deposit information by email?
No. Email can be spoofed, and a real employee mailbox can be taken over. Bank changes should go through a payroll portal protected by multi-factor authentication or be confirmed by phone or in person.
What should I do if we already sent a paycheck to a scammer?
Call your bank and payroll provider immediately to try to stop or recall the deposit, report it at ic3.gov, check the employee's email account for signs of compromise, and change your process so bank details are always verified by phone.
Who is responsible if payroll is sent to a fraudulent account?
In most cases the business that made the change carries the loss and still owes the employee their pay. That is why a written verification step matters. Talk to your bank, your insurer and an attorney about your specific situation.
Want a second set of eyes on your payroll and email security?
Call Ghosxt at (831) 204-0501. We help businesses across Monterey County and surrounding areas protect email, payroll access and staff accounts against fraud, and you talk directly to the owner. See current pricing or our cybersecurity service.
Book your free assessmentPrefer to talk first? Email sales@ghosxt.com or call (831) 204-0501.